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Abstract
In this paper the relevance of public and symmetric information on 
the enforceability of contracts will be analyze. In particular, it will ex­
amine an historical contract, the sea loan, which was used to finance 
long-distance maritime commerce from the times of ancient Greece to 
those of the Medieval Ages. A single economy general equilibrium mo­
del is set up in which, under certain restrictions, the sea loan emerges as 
the optimal individually rational contract and it is claimed that these 
restrictions were very likely to be satisfied by the economy of that time. 
It will also examine the substitution of this kind of contract— which 
was enforced by a coercive power relying on public information— by 
the commenda. This occurred because of the new supply of symmetric 
and public information, which led an efficient improvement in the sense 
that both the navigation and the commercial risks were shared, while 
in the former contract the merchant undertook all the commercial risk 
alone.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, commenda, contracts, credit, 
Economic History,enforceability, institutions, insurance, 
risk, sea loan.
JEL classification numbers: D81, D82, N23, 017.
*1 am extremely grateful to my supervisor Prof. Ramon Marimon, and in particular 
to Christian Upper and Marion Kohler, and also to my colleagues Aline Hervé, Juan 
A. Rojas Blaya and Patrick Touche for their very helpful comments. I also want 
to thank Nickie Hargreaves and Nickie Owtram for their English supervision, and 
Andrea Drago for his useful suggestions and his patience. All remaining errors are, 






















































































































































































In this paper I will analyze the sea loan contract. This was a contract 
that financed long-distance maritime commerce from the times of ancient 
Greece to those of the tenth century. After this long period, it was 
progressively substituted by the commenda. These two contracts differed 
only in that in the commenda both the commercial and the navigation 
risks were shared, while in the sea loan the merchant bore the commercial 
risk alone. Indeed, the former established a division of profits, deducted 
travelling charges, such that the merchant received j  for his work and 
the investor the remaining |, while the latter contract established a fixed 
contingent transfer( from the merchant to the investor) if the ship came 
back to port safely, regardless of the profitability of the venture, that 
is, despite the commercial risk, and a transfer equal to the value of the 
rescued cargo when there was a case of non-safe arrival. Given that non­
safe arrival usually meant the complete loss of the cargo, the merchant 
was explicitly excused from repayment in this case.
The most remarkable feature of the sea loan is that it provided ins­
urance and credit within the same contract. At first glance, it appears 
that in today’s world credit and insurance are supplied separately. Ho­
wever, most legal systems allow for some insurance in debt contracts, in 
the form of bankruptcy. Standard debt contracts are characterized by 
fixed repayment when the firm is solvent and a declaration of bankruptcy 
if this fixed payment cannot be met, allowing the creditor to recoup as 
much of the debt as possible from the firm’s assets. This is the nature 
of the sea loan, except that the declaration of bankruptcy is unnecessary 
since it is obvious.
As far as I know, the sea loan has not been examined from a con­
tract theory perspective. However, my model is close in spirit to that of 
Townsend(1978) in that the merchant can be viewed as a firm engaged 
in an investment project with random return s. Agent l(the merchant) 
can issue an asset to agent 2(the investor) where the asset is some claim 
on the return of the project. The problem, then, is to determine the type 



























































































sumed that the realization of the return is available to only one party of 
the contract but that the range of possible contingent contracts is limited 
to those which are easily verified by both, and at a cost. He developed 
a model in which the resulting contract is a bond which promises to pay 
some fixed constant unless bankruptcy is declared by agent 1. In that 
event, verification( bankruptcy) costs are incurred, and something less 
than the fixed yield is paid. This payment may be negative. My model 
for the sea loan considers the two limiting assumptions on (contingent) 
verification cost: in the case of commercial business the cost is infinite, or 
there is no way to verify it, whereas the cost of verifying the safe arrival 
of the ship is zero, i.e. it is public information. Thus, my result is similar 
to that of Townsend, except for the information structure that determi­
nes the verification set, and for the treatment of bankruptcy. Townsend 
did not study the functional form of transfers in the case of bankruptcy: 
he only imposed them to be smaller than the fixed constant( in order 
that incentive compatible constraints be satisfied). This, however, is not 
a complete characterization of a standard debt contract.
Regarding bankruptcy, a basic analysis is that of Gale and Hell- 
wig(1985). They proposed a one period model with asymmetric infor­
mation in the form of observing profits. My model for the sea loan 
differs from theirs in that they assumed observation costs, like Town- 
send(1978), and did not enter into consideration of risk-aversion. Thus, 
Gale and Hellwig justify the standard debt contract in terms of obser­
vation costs under asymmetric information and risk-neutrality of both 
agents. They also discuss their problem) a more complicated one that 
includes the level of investment decision and examines credit-rationing) 
when the entrepreneur is risk-averse, and they found that the standard 
debt contract is no longer efficient.
I think that their analysis is not satisfactory in explaining the sea 
loan because their basic assumptions) positive and finite verification costs 
in all states and risk-neutrality) are not appropriate for the period in 
which the sea loan was used. In my model, asymmetric information, with 
no possibility of verification, concerns only the commercial outcome, and, 




























































































its realization— transfers cannot depend on private information in a one 
period model when the asymmetric information is of the type of observing 
and revealing the realization of unique random variable. However, the 
safe arrival of the ship does not imply verification costs and therefore 
a contingent transfer should be established. This should not be viewed 
as the impossibility of fulfilling a fixed payment (which is no longer the 
optimal), but as the efficient contingent contract which determines a 
payment that must be feasible.
The aim of this paper is to explain why the sea loan lasted for 
such a long period and why it was substituted afterwards. In order to 
do this, I will create an artificial economy in which, depending on a key 
parameter, either the sea loan or the commenda emerge as the optimal 
individually rational contract. I claim that my model reproduces the 
historically observed economy in its most relevant features, and that this 
key parameter, measuring the informational asymmetry, changed during 
the Commercial Revolution of the late Middle Ages. Optimality, then, 
would justify both its very long use and its substitution: an efficient 
contract is used until some parameters in the economy change so that it 
is no longer efficient.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
historical evidence and provides the relevant facts. Section 3 places these 
facts in an economic model, which is solved in section 4. Section 5 
introduces an informational technology improvement which render the 
sea loan no longer efficient, and section 6 concludes.
2 Historical facts
The sea loan was a contract that provided the capital required for a ship 
to undertake a commercial long-distance voyage, with the particularity 
that the lender bore a part of the navigation risk. The agreement went 
something like this: a person who had money or merchandise(investor) 
gave it to a merchant— a person who was able, capable and willing 




























































































transfers. Subsequently, the merchant sailed and traded. In the likely 
case that the ship was sunk by a storm, fire or pirates—and the cargo 
lost, the contract established a zero transfer, i.e. it partially insured 
the merchant against the navigation risk.1 If, on the contrary, the ship 
arrived safely in port, the merchant had to give back a positive fixed 
amount which covered capital and interest(caput et prode), regardless of 
the profitability of the venture, that is, the commercial risk( see appendix 
A for historical records of a sea loan).
The first record of a sea loan dates from ancient Greece, when it was 
referred to as nautika or nautikos tokos. The Romans, at the end of the 
Republican period, also adopted it, calling it fenus nauticum or pecunia 
traiecticia. It was used until the middle of the thirteenth century in the 
Mediterranean Sea when it was replaced by the cambium maritimum.2 
However, before this ’’nominal” substitution took place, the primacy of 
the sea loan in financing long-distance commerce was questioned by the 
commenda—a pioneering contract in which both the commercial and 
navigation risks were shared; in fact, the commenda, which dated from 
the end of the tenth century, was the most popular form in the thirteenth 
century.
1 In fact, it did not give as much insurance as the information constraints permitted, 
which is a negative transfer in the case of sinking, but the minimum required for the 
realization of profits. This is confirmed by the respondentia, an advanced kind of sea 
loan which clearly set the transfer in the case of sinking equal to the realization of 
profits. The respondentia took into account the possibility that the ship ran aground 
on entering a harbour, but that the cargo was salvaged before the hull was broken 
up and stipulated that the loan would be repayable upon the safe arrival of a certain 
ship or most of its cargo. A clause similar to this also appeared in contracts dating 
from the ancient Greece (see appendix A .l). The loss of the ship, then, could not be 
used by the owner of the cargo as a pretext to repudiate his debt. This suggests how 
insurance, to this extent, in a sea loan was a necessary requirement and was not the 
aim of the contract.
2 The cambium maritimum involved an advance of funds repayable in another cur­
rency, instead of the same one, contingent upon the safe arrival of the ship. In this 
new form interests on the loan could be hidden by making repayments in another 
currency at a given rate of exchange. Recall that in 1236 the Pope Gregory IX, 
in the decretal Naviganti, formally condemned the sea loan and similar contracts as 




























































































The sea loan lasted for more than 15 centuries. Obviously, many 
things changed over such a long period. However, from the ancient Greece 
to the eleventh century a constant regarding commerce hold: trade was 
heavily limited. At this time an ’’ aureas mediocritas” rather than innova­
tion, in economic terms, was fostered. Nonetheless, commerce did exist 
and long-distance maritime commerce was its most fascinating branch, 
practised only in the most developed and free cities, by full-time mer­
chants. Hence, the sea loan should not be analyzed in the rigid perspec­
tive of either traditional Greek scholars or of feudal justice( see among 
others, Birdzall and Rosenberg (1986), Cohen(1992), Lane(1987), Lo- 
pez(1960), Luzzatto(1961) and Mejier and van Nijf(1992)). ’’ Just price” 
and ’’just wage” were set by tradition, costumes and law, whereas mer­
chant trading contracts were established by negotiation and prices tended 
to clear the market. This applied even more for the late Middle Ages, 
where a commercial revolution took place.3 Innovation, then, spread to 
all areas, especially to the organization of business, as it is shown by the 
commenda.
The nature of long-distance maritime commerce also remained un­
changed in its most relevant features during these two periods (see Cipolla 
(1980), Cohen(1992), de Roover(1963), Di Nero and Tangheroni(1978), 
Lane(1944), Lopez(1943) and (1976), and Luzzatto(1943) and (1954)).
• It was a risky activity.
The probability that the ship would wrecked was high since the 
navigation tools and the quality of ship-building were poor; besides, 
attacks by pirates or enemy ships were frequent. Moreover, this was 
not the only risk a merchant faced: the commercial risk was also 
high. In contrast to today’s practice, the cargo was not sold before
3 Interest rates in the twelfth century in Venice—one of the most important and 
active cities—were set by market conditions and they were not considered as ’’usu­
rious” in the negative way the Church claimed. This is shown in numerous documents 
of debt(see Morozzo della Rocca and Lombardo (1940)) by the qualification of com- 
mon(” secundum usum nostrae terrae” ) to an annual interest of 20 percent( with a 
guarantee of pledge and with a clause of double capital and interest in the case of a 




























































































shipping; hence, when the merchant set sail he did not know the 
price at which he would be able to purchase the merchandise nor 
the quantity that he would be able to buy, nor did he know for 
how much he would sell it when he came back to the original port. 
There is strong evidence that the commercial risk was high during 
the whole period.4 However, there is also evidence that this activity 
was very profitable regardless of the commercial outcome.
• The requirement of capital was high.
Trading by sea involved high fixed costs, including the equipping of 
a ship. Thus, it was likely that the merchant (the person who had 
the ability and the will to commerce) did not have enough capital 
to float a ship, or in the case that he had some capital it might 
be that he wanted more in order to spread the fixed costs (e.g. an 
anchor, the crew’s wages or the possibility of travellers’ death).
• Capital was scarce.
Ventures were very big with respect to resources. In fact, a single 
voyage was financed by many investors( not only to diversify risk, 
but because of the lack of capital). This shortage of capital in the 
economy as a whole cause interest rates be high.
Moreover, there is evidence that most investors were not rich.
• There were poor informational flows—the rise of travelling mer­
chants.
The flow of information was very poor. It was scarce and it took 
a great deal of time. This was because the cost of transporta­
tion was high (there were no independent and rapid mail services) 
so that information was transmitted by the same ships that were 
trading; moreover, transactions were not frequent and they took
4Even after the eleventh century when, as Lopez(1976) pointed out, a commercial 
revolution started with an increase in the number of transactions, an improvement 
of commercial techniques and the flow of information, a delay of no more than a few 
months in the arrival of the convoy from Alessandria to Venice in 1225 made the 




























































































place in markets which were not well-known. Given that there was 
no communication, it was impossible for two merchants( subordi­
nated or not) in different markets to employ a shipper, and thus 
save themselves the risk, inconvenience and time to travel. Fur­
thermore, it was impossible for any person other than the travel­
ler to carry out his affairs: business needed quick decision-making 
based on the information available to the travelling partner. In 
conclusion, a sedentary merchant could neither communicate with 
another merchant in a long-distance market nor send a subordinate 
with complete instructions; as a result, he himself had to travel and 
trade.
• There was asymmetric information—no separation between owner­
ship and management.
The realization of profits5 when ships did not sink were neither 
verifiable nor observable given the state of informational techno­
logy before the Commercial Revolution. The travelling merchant 
was the only person to know the true value of the realization of 
the commercial outcome; no one else could verify either how much 
he had paid for a merchandise in a long-distance(=unknown) mar­
ket nor how much he had sold it at. Hence, he was the residual 
claimant, i.e. the one who receives whatever is left from profits af­
ter the other agent receives his payoff.6 However, the Commercial 
Revolution introduced the development of new techniques such as
5 Profit is used to indicate the amount of consumption goods that was available 
before transfers were paid.
6 These impossibilities of control and supervision (from the merchant to the travel­
ler and from the "capitalist” to the merchant) were reinforced by the legal negation 
of direct representation by Roman law. There was a legal restriction prohibiting a 
traveller to contract in the name of a merchant or a merchant in the name of another: 
the consequences of business(debts or profit-sharing) had a legal effect exclusively on 
the agent and only after concluding his affairs with a third part could he satisfy his 
agreements with the principal. Thus, the merchant had to be the owner of the capital 
in order to trade, as well as the owner of profits. This was similar to saying that he 
was the residual claimant. This was recognized by law, which classified the sea loan 
as a kind of debt contract(a ” mutuo” ). On the other hand, the lack of recognition of 




























































































new mercantile book-keeping, which facilitated control and provi­
ded information, bills of land, bills of exchange, etc., which helped 
to observe profits.
Conversely, the arrival of the ship was public information. Some 
of the contracts were signed for a round trip(especially the oldest) 
whereas some others established a one-way trip. In any case, the 
safe arrival of the ship was publicly observable by the investor or a 
reliable person of his own who was in the port of arrival. However, 
the sinking or the attack of a ship was not directly observed by 
the investor, who did not travel with this ship, and, what is more, 
given the structure of the contract (no repayment in the case of a 
sea disaster), the merchant had an incentive to claim that there 
was such a disaster. He could have simply disappeared but this 
would have implied giving up his family, his possessions and the 
opportunity to complete the trade( since operating in long-distance 
commerce required a legal structure not available in many places; 
in turn, people in these places frequently treated foreigners with 
suspicion). He could have changed the cargo to another ship and 
then sunk it7 but on coming back to the home port it would have 
been ” difficult” to explain that the contracted ship had sunk and 
the cargo been lost while the merchant and the whole crew had 
been miraculously rescued by a ship full of profitable merchandise, 
though with no crew. In conclusion, the realization of the sea risk 
was directly or indirectly observable by the investor and verifiable, 
because of the relatively developed political system.
• There was a coercive power—verifiability.
This contract was developed in well organized economies, where 
the state had certain powers. In particular, this institution was 
able to act as a coercive power, and thus to enforce contracts based 
on public information. Therefore, there was no distinction between 
observability and verifiability.





























































































• It was a complex activity— full-time merchants.
Our merchant needed to know about prices, weights, coins, mer­
cantile practices and law, like any other merchant, but when tra­
ding in long-distance markets he had to extend his knowledge to 
the weights, coins and practices(including the language) of remote 
markets. Moreover, ours was a travelling merchant and hence a sea­
man; this necessitated training and much time to travel. Therefore, 
the travelling merchant had to be a full-time merchant.
In conclusion, this was a full-time travelling merchant who opera­
ted in his own name( being the residual claimant) and thus assumed risk 
and performed in his own interest, all of which was incompatible with 
being a subordinate.
Nothing leads us to think that agents, either lenders or borrowers, 
were risk- neutral.8 In most articles, this assumption is taken in order to 
simplify calculus. Most of the times it is not misleading since the analysis 
does not focus on risk-sharing. However, the sea loan was a contingent 
contract which provided insurance only to some extent— it did not cover 
the navigation risk completely since the merchant consumed less in the 
case where the ship was wrecked than otherwise. It could be the case 
that the transfer in the case of a sunk ship was negative, i.e. that both 
the lender and the borrower agreed that the lender might pay a positive
8In fact, history shows an uninterrupted desire for agents to get insured. Investors 
financed voyages only partially, diversifying through different periods and routes, and 
shared the property of anchors and ships in order to avoid risk. By their part, mer­
chants diversified through different products and branches of activity. This trend 
culminated with the creation of the premium insurance. However, this was not until 
the fourteen century. It is notable that the first record of a maritime insurance pre­
mium dated from 1350 when the Commercial Revolution was over and consequently 
not only had the sea risk dramatically decreased but the number of transactions had 
increased sufficiently for the risk to be spread completely. This first record is from 
Palermo and given that Palermo was a secondary centre and that the contract was si­
gned by a Genoese, de Roover(1963) assumed that the premium insurance was known 




























































































amount to the merchant, regardless of the loss of the anticipated capital. 
Thus, assumptions about risk-aversion are fundamental.
Commonly, the investor is assumed to be risk- neutral since com­
petitive markets are also assumed. When the number of operations is 
large enough( a continuum) the law of large numbers applies, that is, 
the risk can be completely spread, and hence risk-averse agents can be 
treated as risk-neutral because they diversify and in this way avoid risk. 
On the contrary, the number of transactions in the period the sea loan 
was used were very small.9 In fact, this little commerce was one of the 
most relevant features of that period. Therefore, assuming risk-neutral 
agents does not make sense.
3 The model
The environment described above can be characterized by a static model. 
This is a leading assumption in the analysis and it is restrictive. The 
justification for this assumption is that transactions were reduced to a 
minimum and were rarely repeated, hence there was no role for dynamic 
mechanisms. Besides, contracts were signed for only one trip, i.e. a single 
period.
There are two technologies in this economy: one riskless, say land, 
and the other risky but more productive, say a long-distance maritime 
voyage. Both technologies involve two dates, 0 and 1. At the first date, 
investment is chosen; at the second one, the return is produced. The 
former technology yields a riskless return of r > 1 in the second stage 
for each first-stage-invested unit of the only consumption good in which 
every thing is measured. The voyage needs k units to be financed and 
it yields a random outcome s £ S — {y, x, x }  with probability p(s), 
where y denotes the state if the ship is sunk,10 and x and x stand for
9In other words, ventures in that period were very large with respect to resources. 
This is comparable to todays’ situation for earthquakes in Japan. No insurance com­
pany is insuring against these events, because they cannot achieve perfect risk-pooling. 
I want to thank Ramon Marimon for pointing this out to me.




























































































the commercial realization. In other words, there are two kinds of risk: 
the navigation risk and the commercial risk. First, it may be that the 
ship sink, and only if this is not the case— which I represent by the 
pre-state x, the commercial outcome is produced; hence, if p(y) =  p, 
p(x) =  (1 -  p )(l -  q) and p(x) =  (1 -  p)q.
The voyage is more productive in the sense that 
T . p(s) s > kr
s=y ,x ,x
with
x > x >  y < kr
There are two agents, indexed by i and a coercive power called 
il Comune11 which defines property rights to such a degree that only 
voluntary exchange occurs. It also enforces contracts conditioned on any 
publicly available information, so that there is no distinction between 
observability and verifiability. Agent 1, the merchant, is initially endowed




























































































with the possibility to undertake the risky project specified above but not 
with the necessary capital to finance it; hence, if the voyage is financed his 
endowment at date 1 is the random variable S, which possible realizations 
are the states s. Agent 2, the investor, is endowed with k2 > k units 
of capital at date 0, and has to decide whether to invest in land or 
finance the project. Thus, (k2 — k)r is his endowment after financing 
the project. Let agents 1 and 2 be expected utility maximizers over 
the single consumption good of the model, and let their preferences be 
represented by continuous, twice differentiable and strictly increasing 
utility functions depending on their own second-stage consumption,12 
U(ci) := Ui(ci) for i= l,2  with U'(.) >  0 and U"(.) <  0. In other words, 
both agents have the same preferences and are risk-averse.
A crucial assumption is that agents have asymmetric information. 
At date 0 the state has not yet been realized, so it cannot be observed. 
Therefore, I will only refer to the second date: the arrival of the ship is 
public information, whereas the realization of the commercial risk is not 
always so. For the period before the Commercial Revolution, I assume 
that agent 2 is unable to distinguish between the commercial states, but 
he knows, and can verify, that these were no smaller than x.13 However, 
during the Commercial Revolution there was an information technology 
improvement which permitted agent 2 to observe the true state. This 
change in the observability of the commercial state can be measured by 
the parameter 8, with 6 — 0 for the period previous to the Commer­
cial Revolution and 8 — 1 afterwards.14 Thus, the observable/verifiable 
commercial state is
maxjr, 8 s } < s for s =  x, x
12Agents only consume at date 1.
13Conceptually, the state x is different from the minimum verifiable outcome, say 
x min(< i ) .  This can be thought as the minimum agent 1 can declare, or, historically, 
the pledge merchandise.
14It is more realistic to assume 8 € [0,1) since the Commercial Revolution led to 
a reduction in the private information concerning the commercial states, but it did 
not canceled this information asymmetry. However, the following analysis, for the 




























































































Note that for 0 =  0, the observable commercial states do not depend 
on the true ones.
Definition 1 A contract( at date 0) for this economy specifies (r(y ), 
t(x ), t (x)), where r(s), either > 0 or < 0, is the (ex-post)transfer agent
1 gives to agent 2 when the state is s, for s =  y ,x ,x .
Let C\ ci(s) =  s — r(s) and c2 C2 (s) — (k2 — k)r +  r(s) denote 
the consumption of agent i — 1,2 when the state is s , for s =  y ,x ,x ,  
and consequently the voyage has been financed; otherwise, each agent 
consumes his autarky endowment, that is, 0 and k2 r for agents 1 and
2 respectively. Note that Cj(s), c2(s) and r(s) are not functions of s — 
y ,x ,x —which are parameters— but different variables in each state.
Definition 2 A contract is efficient if there is no other feasible con­
tract, satisfying all the constraints, that yields a higher expected utility 
for agent 1 for some fixed value of agent 2’s expected utility.15
In order to show that a contract is efficient, it has to be proven that 
it is so regardless of the level at which the reservation value of agent 2 
(U2 ) is fixed, provided that participation constraints are satisfied. Thus, 
bargaining-power is irrelevant for the analysis, since the characterization 
of an efficient point provides a sort of contract regardless of who had a 
particular bargaining-power.
Definition 3 A sea loan is a contract in which r(y) =  y and t(x) —
r(x).
Definition 4 A commenda is a contract in which r(y) — y and 
r(x) < r(x).
15Notice that for a contract to be efficient, it has to satisfy well-defined participation 
constraints, so that efficiency implies, within this context, individual-rationality. I 
am interested in this, rather than in all contract curve points, because contracts were 
established by voluntary negotiation, given certain initial endowments. However, 
because of notational simplicity, I will assume that performing in oversea trade is 
always convenient for the merchant, and thus his participation constraint will not 
need to be imposed. Given that his initial endowment of the single consumption good 
is zero, his reservation value depends only on the subjective value he assigns to his 
life, and this is unknown; therefore, I will assume that this subjective value is smaller 





























































































4 Solving the model for 0 = 0
I assume 6 — 0 for the period before the Commercial Revolution and, 
therefore, for the analysis of the sea loan.
Since transfers go from one agent to the other, feasibility is always 
satisfied, and the efficient contract solves the following program.
Program 1:
max Y  p(s) ^ i {s — ^(s)}r(s) s=y,x,i
S.t. Y  p{s)U2{{k2 -  k)r +  t(s)}  >  U2
s=y,x,x
(1)
Ui{s — r (s )} >  U\{s — r (s ')} for s, s' =  x,x (2)
s — r(s) > 0 for s =  y,x, x (3)
(k2 — k)r +  r(s) > 0 for s =  y, x , x (4)
where equation(l) is the participation constraint of agent 2. His 
best alternative is to invest in land, and, consequently, an optimal con­
tract has to provide him with at least the same expected utility. De­
pending on his bargaining-power, Ui(> U2{k2r})  will take a particular 
value, for which the participation constraint of agent 2 must hold with 
equality, as is implied by definition 2 within my model.
Equation (2) is the incentive compatible constraint for 0 =  0, where 
s is the actual commercial state and s' is the claim of agent 1 concerning 
the commercial state. Note that for the state y, an equivalent constraint 
is not imposed, since the safe-arrival of the ship is public information and, 
hence, this contingent transfer does not have to depend on the revelation 
of agent 1.
Equations (3)-(4) are the nonnegativity constraints on consump­
tion. It is possible to assume that (4) is nonbinding without altering the 
surface of the problem: just assume that (k2 — k)r is big enough to satisfy 




























































































already received k >  0 from agent 2, he must repay a positive amount in 
the most profitable states, otherwise his project will not be financed.
There are two important parts in the resolution of program 1. The 
first deals with asymmetric information and it is encompassed in equa­
tion (2). Townsend(1982) showed that under the assumption of no ob­
servability/no verifiability by agent 2, (6 =  0), in a model of one only 
period—and, hence, without any role for reputation or other dynamic 
mechanisms— transfers cannot depend on the revealed state. Hence, in 
the optimum
r(x) — t(x ) =  r(x)
Therefore, the consumption of agent 2 does not depend on the com­
mercial state, c2(x ) =  c2(x) — c2(x)—where c2(x) has been introduced 
to simplify the notation.
The second part relates to risk-sharing in a pure exchange economy. 
Thus, the efficient contract will necessarily depend on the agents risk 
preferences.
Making the participation constraint of agent 2 hold with equality, 
substituting the incentive constraints into the equations, and imposing 
the nonnegativity constraint on consumption of agent 2 to be nonbin­
ding, program 1 becomes program 2. In order to simplify notation, let 
E[ui{r(y),T(x),T{x)}} =  £ a=y^ i p(s)Ul{s  -  t(s) }  and 
s îu2 { r ( 2/) ,r (x ),r (x )}]  =  E.=ytx<xP(s)U2{(k2 -  k)r +  t(s)}.
Program 2:
max E[ui{T(y), t(x), r(x)}]
n*).'r(y)






























































































The solution is characterized by the intersection between the par­
ticipation constraint of agent 2 holding with equality and the contract 
curve defined by the Kuhn Tucker conditions. In order to be feasible, 
this intersection has to be inside the Edgeworth box.
4.1 The Participation Constraint
From the participation constraint of agent 2 holding with equality (5), it 
follows that there is a functional relationship between his consumption in 
each state. This relationship can be defined by a function PC  : 3î+ —+ Re­
mapping the consumption of agent 2 in the state y into his consumption 
in the other states such that (5) is satisfied: c2(x) =  PC{c.2(y)}.
qU2{ {k 2 -k )r + T (x ) }  +  ( l - q ) U 2{(k 2 -k )r+ T {y ) }  =  U2 > U2(k2r) (5)
q U2{(k2 -  k)r +  r (x )} dr(x) +  (1 -  q) U'2{(k2 -  k)r +  r(?/)} dr(y) =  0
dc2(x) _  dr(x) _  1 -  g U2{(k2 -  k)r +  r(y)}  
dc2(y) dr(y) q U2{(k2 -  k)r +  r (x )}
It is also known that the point (12r, 12r) satisfies (5) for U2 — 
U2(k2 r). Thus, the derivative of PC  at this point is — If agent 2 were 
risk-neutral, his utility function would be linear and hence his indifference 
curve for this utility level would cut the border of the Edgeworth box at 
(C2 (y ) ,P C {c2(y) } )  =  ((k2 -  k)r +  y,(k2 -  k)r +  If agent 2
were risk-averse,16 this intersection would occur at a point where r(x) =
tpc >  k r - [ l - q) y  w it h  
9
tpc -  [(ix +  k2 r) “ — (1 — g)[w +  (k2 — k)r +  y] ? — [w -f (12 — k)r]
(6)




























































































as is depicted in figure l .17 In general( for all possible values of U2), 
the indifference curve of agent 2 will cut the Edgeworth box at some point 
((k2 — k)r +  y, (k2 — k)r +  tz) with
tx > tpc (7)
From figure 1 it is clear without further analysis that a contract 
providing full insurance to agent 2(c2( i )  =  c2(x) =  c2(y)) is not feasible 
as long as y < kr, which is the case for y — 0.
4.2 The contract curve
The contract curve for interior points is defined by
pU [{x  -  t(x ) }  +  (1 -  p)U[{x -  t(x) }  U'2{(k2 -  k)r +  r (x )}
U [ { y - r { y ) }  U'2{ { k 2 -  k)r +  r(y)}
The contract curve for comer points must satisfy the Kuhn Tucker 
conditions, that is, (8) with > or < depending on the border. These de­
fine the contract curve in general. However, a complete characterization 
of it requires a specification of a particular sort of utility function.
Agent 1 risk-averse and agent 2 risk-neutral
As is shown in figure 2, if agent 1 were risk-averse and agent 2 risk- 
neutral the sea loan would not be optimal, since the intersection between 
the contract curve and the participation constraint of agent 2 holding 
with equality would not occur at a point in which r(y) =  y(see appen­
dix B.l). In fact, the optimal contract would provide as much maritime
17Notice that transfers and agent 2’consumption are two state contingent, while 
agent 1’ consumption is three state contingent. This is why the consumption of agent 
1 has two different origins in the Edgeworth box. Notice also how the shadowed area 




























































































insurance as possible to agent 1 —in the case of non-safe arrival, the mer­
chant would not only be released of his repayment obligations but would 
receive some positive amount ( r(y) <  y =  0); nonetheless, the remaining 
information constraints make agent 1 to undertake the commercial risk.18
Agent 1 risk-neutral and agent 2 risk-averse
On the other hand, if agent 1 were risk-neutral and agent 2 risk- 
averse, the sea loan would be optimal( see figure 3 and Appendix B.2) 
and would also be so if both agents were risk-neutral, since then any 
division of risk would be optimal.
Both agent 1 and 2 risk-averse
Let us now consider the most likely case in which both agents 
are risk-averse(see section 2 for a historical motivation) with a constant 
degree of relative risk-aversion. Thus, a general representation of the 
agent’s utility functions is
U(ci) = Ui(ci) =  (to +  c;)'
with p >  1 and w >  0, for i =  1,2, and with {/'(.) > 0, {/"(.) < 0, 
[/'"(.) > 0, R{.) > 0, r(.) =  r > 0, where R(.) is the coefficient of 
absolute risk-aversion and r is the coefficient of relative risk-aversion.
The reason why w is assume to be positive is that otherwise the uti­
lity function specified above will not satisfy the required properties. An 
intuitive reason why w >  0 is not contractable(it is different from c,) is
18 Let x be such that pU[ (x — r (x )}  +  (1 — p)U[ {x — r (x )} =  U[ {x — r (x )}. Then, 
equation (8) can be expressed as U[{x  — r (x )}  =  U[{y — r (y )}. An optimal contract 
is characterized by {r (x ) ,r (y )}  such that c j(x ) =  C j(y). Given that y <  x < x < x, 
it will not provide constant consumption for agent 1: c j(x ) =  x — r(x ) <  ci(x) =  
x — t (x ) =  ci(y) =  y — r(y) <  c i(x ) =  x — r(x ), since we axe in the presence 
of asymmetric information. Thus, the classical result of Arrow and Debreu’s state 
contingent commodity space will not apply; consumption of agent 1 will necessarily 




























































































that it is perceived as a necessary-to-live good, so that any consumption 
below these level would required an extremely hard and bloody enforce­
ment system which—I assume— was not available or socially accepted 
in that period. Alternatively, we can think about w as publicly unknown 
assets or assets whose owners are publicly unknown, so that they cannot 
be used as collateral. This assumption is also valid for the less-developed 
economies of today.
Operating (8) for the above utility function provides an implicit 
function
$ (r (x ),r (y ); A) =  0 (9)
where A represents the vector of parameters (9, w, p, k2, k, r, q,p, y ,x ,  x), 
and t (s ) is the transfer in the state s — y ,x ,x  with r(x) =  r(x) =  r (x ).19 
This function gives the contract curve for interior points. Depending on 
A, the contract curve will either cuts the Edgeworth box at its northern 
border, at any point for which an increase in r(y) will imply r(x) =  x for 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions to be satisfied, or at its eastern one at some point 
where (r (y ),r (x )) =  (y, tcc") with tcc* defined such that (9) is satisfied 
for r (y ) =  y (see figure 4), that is
$(tcc* ,y ;\ )=  +(i-p)
(w+(k2~ k)r+tcc* ) iz£
---------- — -----r=r = 0
(u)+(fc2-Jfc)r+j/) o
The contract curve also cuts the Edgeworth box at its western border( 
see appendix B.3), say at a point in which r(x) =  t.
The contract curve is thus defined by (c2 (y),c2(x)) such that
€ [—(k2 — k)r, —(k2 — k)r +  t] if r(y) =  —(fc2 — k)r (west) 
=  m in{r,x} if r(y) e ( - ( k 2 -  K)r, y]
€[<“ ,£] if T(y) =  V (east)
where r is such that (9) holds and






























































































tcc — min{fcc*,x} (11)
Given that (9) is an implicit function, the contract curve cannot 
be characterized explicitly. Nonetheless, much is known about it( see 
Appendix B.3 and figure 4). For instance, if f** < x, then t < x (since, 
as r(y) increases, r(x) do so in the contract curve) and the contract curve 
does not cut the Edgeworth Box at its northern border c2(r) =  w+x.  By 
construction, it cuts the Edgeworth box at its other relevant border( when 
the restriction r(y) <  y is binding) at (c2(t/), c2(r)) =  (w +  y,w +  tcc), 
which fulfills (9) (see figure 1).
4.3 The efficient contract
Lemma Let be defined by (11), tcc’  by (10), tpc by (6) and tz such 
that Ui — E[u2(y,tx,tx)\.
If
tcc < tpc < tz < x (12)
the sea loan, (y ,tx,tx), will be efficient, i.e. the maximizing utility 
contract in the Edgeworth box. Depending on how much bargaining- 
power agent 2 has( t/2), tx will take some particular value.
The final inequality of (12) simply limits the maximum value of tx, 
because the optimal contract has to be feasible, and the second one comes 
from (7). In other words, parameters have to be such that tcc < tz < x. 
Note that this is not imposing any restriction over the parameters that 
violates any previous constraint.20
tz < x (13)
for the voyage to be financed, since otherwise all feasible contracts would 
give agent 2 less utility than the riskless asset. This implies that
20Restrictions about parameters have been defined throughout section 3 and 4 in 
these terms: 6 =  0,p >  l,u> >  0,fc2 >  fc >  0,r >  l ,g  € (0 ,1 ),p € (0 ,1 ),x >  x >  y <  




























































































x  >  fi [(«; +  fc2r)* — (1 — q)(w +  (k2 -  k)r +  j/)^]]P -  
[w +  (k2 — fc)r](= tpc)
and
tz -  tcc > 0
for the sea loan to be efficient. This is true if
tpc - f c >  0 (14)
Statement It can be proven that the sea loan is the efficient contract 
for certain reasonable parameters.
Table 1, in its second row, sets this parameters at historically rea­
sonable values, for which the sea loan is efficient,21 since
= 30 < tpc =  33.4 < x =  40
Not only is the sea loan efficient for these particular parameters, 
but it is so for a neighbourhood. Table 1 gives in its third row the values 
of each relevant parameter for which the sea loan is efficient, taking the 
other parameters fixed at their initial values(row 2).
table 1
e w P y
0 3 4 0
- - (2.8,11) -
Jt2 k r ? P x X
10 7 1.2 0.4 0.5 40 50
11) (6.7,7.5) (1.08,1.4) (0.37,0.42) (0.01,0.92) (34,47) (40.1,97)




























































































However, these simulations are no more than an illustrative exam­
ple. It has been proven that there are some reasonable parameters for 
which the sea loan emerges as the efficient contract, but would it be so 
for all the other combinations of reasonable parameters? With 10 para­
meters, of which 7 can reasonable vary, many combinations derive, and 
simulating is far from being a complete method. Given that historical 
information about parameters is vague—nothing more about whether a 
parameter was high or low, but without specififying a particular value— 
the derivatives of tpc — tcc with respect to each parameter, if monotone, 
will provide more information about (14).
4.4 Comparative statics
Let x be big enough so that (13) holds,22 that is, let parameters be 
such that the voyage is financed without imposing any particular kind of 
contract.
If (14) holds, then the sea loan is efficient, and figure 1 does capture 
the nature of this environment. If T =  tpc — tcc* > 0, (14) holds— that is 
tpc _  tcc >  0— and tccm < x, since tpc < x was imposed. This is likely to 
be when a particular parameter, A,-, is high and J~ > 0 for all its domain.
• k2 may be relatively low, since capital was scarce and most inve­
stors were not rich,23 and < 024
• r may be high since capital was scarce,23 and > 024
• k may be high, since the requirement of capital was high,23 and
§T >  q24 
dk U
22There is historical evidence showing very high profits regardless of the commercial 
realization, i.e. a very high x(see among others Cohen(1992) and de Roover(1963).
2:iSee section 2.




























































































• q may be low, since long-distance maritime commerce was a risky 
activity,23 and < 024
• p may be low since trading was risky,23 and ^  < 024
• y may be very low, y — 0, since no-arrival meant a complete 
loss,23 and ^  < 024
• x may be high( greater than r), but not too high, since long­
distance maritime commerce was very profitable regardless of the com­
mercial outcome,23 and ^  < 024.
Notice that w >  0 has been introduced in order that the utility 
function U(Ci) =  (w +  c,)7 be well-defined for all its domain, hence its 
value, and its derivative, is irrelevant from a historical point of view. 
Neither is it the coefficient of relative risk-aversion, p.
Therefore, it was very likely that T > 0 so that (12) hold, and 
consequently the sea loan was the efficient contract, ft should also be 
pointed out that the derivatives of T  with respect to all the relevant 
parameters go in the right direction. Thus, if we find some parameters 
which seem reasonable but still the sea loan is not efficient, it is possible 
to make the sea loan efficient simply by redirecting these parameters 
somewhat into the direction they were expected to be in reality.
5 Informational technology improvement,
9 =  1
I assume 9 — 0 for the period before the eleventh century and, there­
fore, for the analysis of the sea loan. The Commercial Revolution of the 
late Middle Ages brought up a large number of innovations related with 
trade. In particular, the informational structure changed, permitting the 
investor to verify the commercial outcome to some extent.25
25 For notational simplicity, I will assume that the commercial state was perfectly 




























































































In other words, the commercial state became public information. 
This was extremely important because with a one-dimensional variable, 
contracts cannot rely on the revealed state( see Townsend(1982)), but 
exclusively on the available public information. Thus, providing new 
public information increased the kind of contracts to be enforceably si­
gned, that is, it enlarged the choice(restricted) set, allowing for efficient 
improvements.
With the sea loan, the merchant undertook all the commercial risk 
(t(x) — t(x )), which would not have been optimal since both agents 
were risk-averse. However, it was so because the merchant was unable to 
credibly commit to reveal a commercial state other than the minimum 
verifiable( x by assumption) and, hence, transfers— r(x), r (x )— could 
only be based on this minimum. With new public information transfers 
can vary between them, allowing to share the commercial risk efficiently. 
This new information is acting like a credible commitment to reveal the 
true value of the state.
5.1 Solving the model for 9 =  1
As with program 1 in section 4, the new efficient contract will set the 
expected utility of agent 2 at his reservation level, and similarly too, 
his nonnegativity constraint on consumption, (4), can be assumed to be 
nonbinding. Hence, the problem to be solved, program 2’, differs from 
program 2 only in that the incentive-constraint (r(z) =  r(x)) is no longer 
imposed, since now the commercial states are public information.
Program 2’ :
s.t.
max £ M 7‘(y ),r (£)>r (*)}]


































































































It is natural to think that if the sea loan solves program 2, the 
commenda will solve program 2’ . Given that both agents are risk-averse, 
they would optimally share the risk, i.e. their consumption levels would 
optimally depend on the state s — y, x, x. Thus, for any optimal level of 
r(y) , r(y) < t(x ) < t(x ). The reason why r(t/),r(j/) <  y , is optimally 
set at y is that in the sea loan both agents agreed on agent 2 having as 
less navigation risk as possible (r(y) =  y) when he did not assume any 
commercial risk. Hence, it is expected that when agent 2 is undertaking 
more commercial risk, he will not assume extra navigation risk.
Lemma If the sea loan solves program 2, the commenda will solve pro­
gram 2’.
Step 1. Ail points of the contract curve are such that x(y) < 
r ( x ) <  t (x ).
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for program 2’ are:
d y )  : - (1  +  -b )(l  -  t )U '{y  -  r(y }} +  A2(l  -  q)U'{(k2 -  k)r +  r(y )} -  /ji = 0  (19)
d s )  : - (1  +  h k ( l  -p ) U ' { x  -  r (s )}  +  A2d l  -p )U '{ (k2  -  k)r +  t(s ) }  -  /jj = 0  (20) 
t(x) ■. ~{\ + \i)qpU'{i  -  t(x)} + \2qpU'{(k2 -  k)r + t(x)} -  =0 (21)
Operating (19)-(21) for U{cì) =  (w +  C;)» for i= l,2  and for inte­
rior p o in ts^  =  — b3 — 0)) we obtain linear relationships between
transfers, (22)-(23):
Proof.
t (x ) =  a i + p lr ( x ) (22)
t (x ).





























































































For corner points, equations (22)-(23) hold with inequality. For 
example, if y2 =  0 and fii and /i3 do not, r(x) =  x < a\ +  P\t(x)  and 
r(x) > a2 + P 2r(y).
Hence, r(x) >  r(x):
x >  t(x ) >  m in{x,a  1 +  0\t(x ) }  >  r(x)
because
if V? -  V3 =  0 
if fi2 =  0 and /i3 > 0 
if fj,2 >  0 and /i3 =  0
and t(x ) >  r (y ):
r(x) =  «i + Pi r(x) 
r(x) =  x > x > t(x) 
t(x ) > + P\t(x)
x > t(x ) >  mm{x, a2 +  /?2 T(y)} >  r(y)
because
if y\ =  =  0
if pi =  0 and y2 > 0 
if Hi > 0 and y2 — 0
t(x ) =  olI +  P2r(y) 
r(x) =  x =  x >  y >  r(y) 
t (x ) > a2 +  P2r(y)
Step 2. The efficient contract establishes r(y) =  y.
Let the sea loan (y,tx,tx) be the solution of program 2, and let 
(y ,t - , tx) be the solution of a restricted version of program 2’ in the 
sense that r(y) =  y is imposed.
From the sea loan being efficient and b ^  tx, it holds that if





























































































E[Ul(ty°,b,b)] <  E{Ul(y ,tx,tx)}
Assume r(y) ^  y. Then the efficient contract t° =  (<s'°, f£°, f10) is 
such that tyo < y and it is possible to write
=  a +  b
tio =  a +  b
with £ (a ) =  0 and b =  p txo +  (1 — p) t-°.
If t° is efficient then, by definition,
E[u2(ty0,a +  b,a +  b)] =  U2 =  E[u2(y ,tx ,tz)\
and
E[ui(tyo,a +  b,a +  b)] > E [u i(y ,t-,tx)\
However, (25) is not true because
(24)
(25)
E[Ul(tyo,a +  b,a +  b)} < E[Ul(ty°,b,b)) < E[Ul(y ,tx,tx)} < E[ux{ y ^ , i*)]
(26)
where the first inequality derives from the utility function being 
concave and E(a) — 0. The second one from the sea loan being efficient 
and
E[u2(y ,tx,tx)} = U 2 =  E[u2(ty°,a +  b,a +  b)} < E[u2(tyo,b,b)]
where the equalities are imposed by (24) and the inequality derives 
from the utility function being concave and E(a) =  0. The third inequa­
lity of (26) holds because the sea loan could have been chosen—program 
2 is a restricted version of program 2’, and it was not because it gives 
less expected utility to agent 1 than the commenda.






























































































Long-distance maritime commerce can be characterized from the times 
of ancient Greece to those of the late Middle Ages by being extremely 
risky, costly, complex and by presenting very poor and asymmetric in­
formational flows ( the merchant was the only one to perfectly verify the 
commercial states). Although it was heavily limited, it did exist and 
it was ruled by voluntary negotiation, instead of law and costume. It 
was performed by full-time travelling merchants who acted in their own 
names and assumed risk in economies where a coercive power enforced 
contracts based on public information. These merchants lacked capital 
and borrowed it from certain investors. Agents were risk-averse since 
they could not achieve perfect risk-pooling.
Here, I reproduce the most relevant features of an economy in 
which the investor was unable to distinguish between the commercial 
outcomes—6 — 0, in a model in which the sea loan emerges as the effi­
cient individually-rational contract, under certain conditions. These are 
satisfied if the venture was very risky, very profitable in the case of safe- 
arrival, and/or required a great deal of scarce capital, which were in fact 
the characteristics of the observed economy.
The sea loan provided both the capital required to undertake a 
long-distance voyage—the contract was signed for only one trip— and 
navigation insurance, to some extent. It did not, however, fully insure 
the merchant against a navigation disaster, in which case the transfer, 
r(y), would have been negative. This was because both agents were 
risk-averse, so none of them would optimally undertake all the risk. In 
fact, the investor provided as little insurance as feasibility imposed; in 
other words, both the merchant and the investor would have preferred 
a contract with higher repayment (less insurance) in the case of a sea 
disaster, but this was not feasible because the merchant was already 
paying as much as he had, y(=  0). Hence, a comer solution— a sea 
loan(r(y) =  y)— was established.
Neither did the sea loan provide commercial insurance, since it was 




























































































no role for reputation, transfers cannot be based on private information( 
r(x) =  r(x) =  r(x)). And only thanks to the existence of a coercive 
power can they be based on public information. Thus, the provision of 
public information is essential for an efficient allocation of the( scarce) 
resources, and hence for growth: if the minimum verifiable commercial 
outcome( x on assumption) were too small for the transfer, r(x), to 
satisfy the participation constraint of agent 2, the voyage would not be 
financed and the capital( k2) would be allocated on the less productive 
activity.
Turning to commercial insurance, a contract like that of the com- 
menda would have been Pareto superior, where both the navigation and 
the commercial risks were shared(r(y) = y ,r (x )  < r(x)). I suggest that 
an information technology improvement^ =  1) began in the eleventh 
century, making agent 2 able to observe and verify the realization of the 
commercial outcome—  to a certain extent— without any private cost, 
and, hence, relaxing the constraint of equal transfers in the case of safe- 





























































































A .l 68 Demosthenes, Against Lacritus 10-13.
Androcles of Sphettus and Nausicrates of Carystus lent to Artemon and 
Apollodorus, both of Phaselis, 3000 drachmas in silver for a voyage from 
Athens to Mende or Scione, and thence to Bosporus— or if they so choose, 
for a voyage to the left part of the Pontus as far as the Borysthenes, and 
thence back to Athens, on interest at the rate of 225 drachmas on the 
1000; but, if they should sail out from Pontus to Hieron after the rising 
of Arcturus, at 300 on the 1000, on the security of 3000 jars of wine 
of Mende, which shall be conveyed from Mende or Scione in the twenty- 
oared ship of which Hyblesius is owner. They give these goods as security, 
owning no money upon them to any other person, nor will they make any 
additional loan upon this security; and they agree to bring back to Athens 
in the same vessel all the goods put on board in Pontus as a return cargo; 
and, if the goods are brought safe to Athens, the borrowers are to pay 
to the lenders the money due in accordance with the agreement within 
twenty days after they shall have arrived at Athens, without deduction 
save for such jettison as the passengers shall have made by common 
agreement, or for money paid to enemies; but without deduction for any 
other loss. And they shall deliver to the lenders in their entirety the goods 
offered as security to be under their absolute control until such time as 
they shall themselves have paid the money due in accordance with the 
agreement. And, if they shall not pay it within the time agreed upon, it 
shall be lawful for the lenders to pledge the goods or even to sell them for 
such price as they can get; and if the proceeds fall short of the sum which 
the lenders should receive an accordance with the agreement, it shall be 
lawful for the lenders, whether severally or jointly, to collect the amount 
by proceeding against Artemon and Apollodorus, and against all their 
property whether on land or sea, wheresoever it may be, precisely as if 
judgement had been rendered against them and they had defaulted in 
payment. And if they do not enter Pontus, but remain in the Hellespont 




























































































port where the Athenians have no right of reprisal, and from thence 
complete their voyage to Athens, let them pay the interest written into 
the contract the year before. And if the vessel in which the goods shall 
be conveyed suffers aught beyond repair, but the security is saved, let 
whatever is saved be the joint property of the lenders. And in regard 
to these matters nothing shall have greater effect than the agreement. 
Witnesses: Phormio of Piraeus, Cephisodotus of Boeotia, Heliodorus of 
Pitthus.
(trans. Vince)
(68 Demosthenes, Against Lacritus 10-13 cited by Mejier and 0 . 




























































































A .2 Atto notarile veneziano relativo ad un prestito
marittimo
Nel nome del Signore Dio e del Salvatore nostro Gesù Cristo. Nell’anno 
del Signore 1131, mese di agosto, indizione nona, rialto. Io Viviano da 
Molin de confinio di Santo Eustadio, con i miei eredi, poiché ho ricevuto 
da te Pinia, vedova di Stefano Pollani de confinio di San Mosè e mia 
cognata, e dai tuoi eredi, duecento libbre di denari, che mi hai dato da 
portare ad Arta con una nave dove come nocchiero si imbarchi Almerigo 
Caput in Collo, da dove in tempo con quella mudua (convoglio) che per 
prima deve giungere a Venezia, io verrò o ti trasmetterò tramite un uomo 
fidato, con la testimonianza di uomini fidati, duecentocinquenta libbre 
di denari del tuo soprascritto prestito, salvo un imprevisto ostacolo, e 
entro trenta giorni da che lo stesso convoglio di navi sarà approdato in 
Venezia, io verrò e ti pagherò il soprascritto prestito e tu devi ritenerti 
soddisfatta delle soprascritte duecentocinquenta libbre di denari, senza 
porre ostacoli; tuttavia questo prestito deve ritenersi in periculo fino 
al termine predetto, cioè fino a quando le stesse navi saranno giunte a 
Venezia. E se non osserverò tutte le clausole di cui sopra, allora tutto 
quanto in duplo caput et prode, con i miei eredi promettiamo di dare a te 
e ai tuoi eredi, togliendolo dalla terra, dalla mia casa e da tutto ciò che 
possiedo.
Io Viviano da Molin di mio pugno ho sottoscritto.
Io Pietro Faletro, testimone, ho sottoscritto.
Io Domenico, testimone, ho sottoscritto.
Io, Vitale Longo, testimone, ho sottoscritto.
S.T. Io, Urso presbitero e notaio ho compilato ed ho dato fede.
(R. Morozzo Della Rocca-A. Lombardo, Documenti del commercio 
veneziano, sec. XI-XIII, Voi. I, Ed. Lib. It., Torino, 1940, doc. n 61, p. 




























































































B Characterization of the contract curve
B .l Agent 1 risk-averse and agent 2 risk-neutral
Agent 2 being risk-neutral implies that his utility function is linear and 
its first derivative a constant. Thus, the right-hand side of (8) is equal to 
1, so that the contract curve for interior points is characterized, in this 
case, by (c2(y), C2 (x)) such that
PU[{cx(x )} +  (1 -p )U [ {Cl(x )} =  U [{ci(y)} (27)
where c2(y) =  (k 2 -k )r  +  r(y ), c2(x) =  c2(z) =  c2(x) =  (k 2 -k )r  +  
t(x ), cx(x) =  x -  r(x), ci(x) =  x -  t(x) and cx{y) =  y -  r(y). 
Operating (27) for f7i{c!(s)} =  (w -f Ci(s))o with p >  1 provides am im­
plicit function mapping the transfer in the state y into the (fixed)transfer 
in the other states( r(x) =  r(x) =  r(x)) for some parameters A, r(x) =  
<p(r(y); A). As in subsection B.3, its derivatives can be calculated locally, 
with <p'(r(y); A) >  0, that is tp(r(y);\) is monotonically increasing in
r(y)-
Lemma The interior points of the contract curve belongs to the 
area between the 45 degree lines passing respectively through the origin 
of agent 1 when s =  x and s =  x in the Edgeworth box.
In order that (27) holds, x — r(x) < y — r(y) < x — r(x) hence,
x -  y 4- r(y) < r(x) < x - y  +  r(y) (28)
where the first and third expressions are the 45 degree lines passing re­
spectively through the origin of agent 1 when s — x and s =  x in the 
Edgeworth box.
Lemma Some border points of the contract curve are such that 




























































































This is because <p(r(y); A) is monotonically increasing and tx — 
<p(y; A) > x, from the evaluation of (28) at r(y) — y ; hence, nonnegative- 
consumption constraints are binding and t {x ) is fixed at its maximum 
value x.
Thus, the intersection between the contract curve and the partici­
pation constraint of agent 2 will take place at a point in which r(y) ^  y, 
since for r(y) =  y the value of t (x ) that makes the contract curve hold, x, 
is greater than the value for which the participation constraint of agent 
2 is satisfied with equality.
B.2 Agent 1 risk-neutral and agent 2 risk-averse
The contract curve for interior points is characterized, in this case, by 
(c2(y ),c2(x )) such that
t /'{c2(z )} =  U'2{c2{y )}
Hence, the contract curve is such that c2(x) =  c2(y) for interior 
points and c2(a;) >  c2(y) =  (k2 -  k)r -|- y otherwise(see figure 3).
B.3 Both agent 1 and 2 risk-averse
The contract curve for interior points is characterized, in this case, by 
(c2(y), c2(x)) such that
pE /{{ci(j)} +  (l -p )U [ {Cl(x )j  _  U [{cj(y)}
U'2{c2{x )} U'2{c2{y)}
Operating (29) for
U(ci) =  (w +  c<)' for i= l,2
provides an implicit function, i.e. it implicitly, and uniquely, deter­




























































































[(£2 — fc)r,x], as a function of the transfer in the state y, r(y) E B =  
p 2  -  fc)r,y]: r(x) =  ip(r(y);A), where A is a vector of parameters.
Applying the implicit function theorem, the derivatives of <p(r(y); A) 
can be locally calculated at any point (r(y), t(x )) : r(x) — <p(r(y); A) for 
open neighbourhoods B' C B, A' C A.
Note that in the interior points of the contract curve, an increase 
in r(y) implies an increase in r(x), and viceversa, that is <p(r(y);\) is 






a(T(y)) -  ( 1 - p)[w +  y -T (y ) ]  2+e l[w +  ( k 2 -k ) r  +  w +  y]
HT(y ) ,T(x )) =  p[r{y) +  w +  (k2 -  k)r]Lr [p[r(x) +  w +  (k2 -  k)r]l~l?
p ( , l - p ) ( x - T ( x ) + w )-2+l1 1 . ( - l+ p X - l+ p ) ( £ -T ( :e ) + w )-2+<l~1
O2 +  »2
(1 p - 1 )p[ ( K * - ’-(i)+™ )~1+<1 ’ j | ( - 1+ p )(a -r (i)+ « .) *+<’
(T(x)+w+(lc2—k)r)i}~
Lemma The efficient contract will not provide maximum insurance 
for either of the agents. Moreover, the contract curve belongs to the area 
in between.
Proof:
Let (29) be expressed as
PU\{Ci(*)} + (1 ~ p)U[{c\{x)} _  U'2{c2{x)}
U[{ci(y)} Uiiaiv)}





























































































and recall that U"(.) < 0 for all its domain.
• Let C2 (y) > c2(x)— and hence r(y) >  r(x )— then either ci(y) > 
C\(x), which is in contradiction with r(y) > r(x), or agent 1 is risk- 
neutral or risk-lover, which is not the case. Therefore, c2(y) < c2(x). 
In particular, for r(y) =  —(k2 — k) r, r(x) takes some value t > 
—(k2 — k)r, and the contract curve is defined for border points such 
that (c2(y), c2(x)) =  (w,w +  r(x)) with r(x) < t.
• Let ci(y) >  Ci(x) 26, then either c2(y) >  c2(x), which is a con­
tradiction, or agent 2 is risk-neutral or risk-lover, which is not the case. 
Therefore, Ci(y) <  Ci(x). QED
C Comparative statics
Let tcc* be defined by
y; A) = p ( w + x - t cc•) f  +(1 - p ) ( w + x - t cc’ ) t 
(w+(k2—k)r+tce* ) p
---------- ^  = 0
(ti>+(fc2-i)r+y) P
(30)
Suppose that tcc* £ A C 3? and A £ P  C 3?10 satisfy (30)26 7 and 
let A' C A and P' C P  be open neighbourhoods of tcc* and A with a 
uniquely determined ” implicit” function tcc*(y; A) : P' —» A! such that
*(*“ *(y,A),»;A) =  0 VAG P 1 and
tcc*(y, A) =  tcc*
Since d>(.)28 is continuously differentiable with respect to all its
26Notice that the equality implies a contract curve as the one in subsection B.l.
27A program, written in Fortran, that calculates the efficient contract( and also 
tcc*) is available under request.
28From now onwards the functions tcc*(y, A) and $ ( icc*(y. A), y; A) will be respec­
































































































1-2g 1 — 2p




p(w+g-tee*) P + (l-p )(w + x -t" ')  P
(w+(k2—k)r+tc •)'
> 0(?É 0)
</ie Implicit Function Theorem—ensures the existence of such an 
implicit function, tcc*(y, A), and— gives the first-order comparative sta­






for k = l , . .. ,8
Hence,
A)
dk2 >  0 because 3*2 ^ U
,which derives from
a»(«ce*i a) _  i-£




1-P 1-P ' 
p(u;+z-<cc*) p +(1—p) (u;+x—tcc*) p
_(ui+(lfe2-fc)r+y)P (ui+(fc2—J:)r+tcc*
i=£ 11» C fw+(fc2 —k)r+tcc*) »
W ~pP (»+(l2-t)r+,) 0
(w+(k2-k)r+y) * (u»+(ife2—fc)r+tcc*) P
i_n£ it; p f 1 1 1 „
(t»+(*2-fc)r+y) » [(w+(k2-k)r+y) (w+(k2- k)r+tcc* ) J 1
where the first and third equalities derive from simply operating 
and the second one from imposing <£>(fcc*; A) =  0( we are calculating the 
derivative at a solution point!). From appendix B.3 it is known that 
c2(y) — (k2 — k)r +  r(y) < (k2 — k)r +  r(x) =  c2(x) Vr(y), r(x), and in 
particular for r(y) =  y and r(x) =  tcc*, that is, y < tcc*. Thus, the last 




























































































™ < 0  because > 0
,which derives from applying the same reasoning as above to
»E(<CC*;A)
dk
. L z£ -
1=£ tv p
(u>+(k2-k)r+y) P
[(uH-(it2-Jfc)r+y) (w + (k2—k )r+ tee*) ] T >  0
^ > 0  because ^ ^ < 0  
,which derives from applying the same reasoning as above to
d<t>(tcc‘ ; \ )  _
dr p
1
(w + (k 2 - k ) r + y ) ^  L {w+(k2—k)r+y)  («+ (*2 -* )r+ l - )
(*2 -  Jfc) < 0
d t " ’ ( \ )  _  Q
dq
ln£
* ^ 1 > 0  since =  (*+«-«"•) * -(»+*-£•) '  < 0
dp dp (w + (k2—k )r + tcc*) p
l~P
^ > 0  since =  ------^ ------r < 0
dy 9y  p (w + (k2—k)r+y)  P
^ > 0  since « 5 l  =  ( l - p ) i f  (zn +  x - t - ) 1̂  < 0  
^ P > 0  since 2 * ig p = p l^ (u , +  2 - f « )1? 4 < 0
Let tpc be defined by
tpc = -  +  k2 r) p — (1 — q)(w +  (k2 — k)r +  y)"
3
Hence,





























































































dk2\ =  -  r +  [i [(w +  k1r)'“ -  (1 -  q)(w +  (k2 -  k)r +  y)*]] 
(w +  k 2 r ) ^  — (w +  (k2 — k)r +  y )- ^  < 0
liip -i
because p > 1, q £ (0,1) and y < kr, hence (w +  k2r)" > (w +
l~p(k2 — k)r +  y)" >  (1 — q) (w +  (k2 — k)r +  y)" and (w +  k2r) ? <
(w +  (k2 -  k)r +  y ) ~ f .
^  =  r +  [i [(w +  k2r)Lr -  (1 -  q)(w +  (k2 -  k)r +  y )* ]]P 
(w +  (k2 — k)r -+- y)_*£ > 0 
since p > 1, q G (0,1) and y < kr.
- ( * 2 - * ) +
[(ui +  k2r)kp -  (1 -  q)[w +  (k2 -  k)r +  y]*]]P lq 
k2(w +  k 2 r -  (1 -  q)(k2 -  k)[w +  (k2 -  k)r +  y ] ^  
which is positive sometimes and negative other times.
% - =  p[\ [(w +  k2r)lp -  (l -  q)(w +  (k2 -  k)r +  y ) ^
(w + (k2-k )r+y) p — (w+k2 r) <> ^  q
because p > 1, q £ (0,1) and y < kr, hence (w +  1 2 r ) ' > (w +  






























































































W  = ~ [I [(w +  k2r) lp -  (1 ~ q)(w +  ~ k)r +  y) ' } ] ‘
^  (w +  (k2 — k)r +  y) * < 0
because p > 1, q G (0,1) and y < kr, hence (w +  &2r)» 









dk2 ~ dk2 dk2
dT dtpc dtcc*





































































































dT _  dtpc dtcc*
dy dy dy
dT _  dtpc dtcc*
dx dx dx
dT _  dt^ dtcc*
dx dx dx
The evaluation of
dT _  dtpc dtcc*
dr dr dr
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